Abstract. Embedded distributed systems have become an integral part of safetycritical computing applications, necessitating system designs that incorporate fault tolerant clock synchronization in order to achieve ultra-reliable assurance levels. Many efficient clock synchronization protocols do not, however, address Byzantine failures, and most protocols that do tolerate Byzantine failures do not self-stabilize. Of the Byzantine self-stabilizing clock synchronization algorithms that exist in the literature, they are based on either unjustifiably strong assumptions about initial synchrony of the nodes or on the existence of a common pulse at the nodes. The Byzantine self-stabilizing clock synchronization protocol presented here does not rely on any assumptions about the initial state of the clocks. Furthermore, there is neither a central clock nor an externally generated pulse system. The proposed protocol converges deterministically, is scalable, and self-stabilizes in a short amount of time. The convergence time is linear with respect to the self-stabilization period. Proofs of the correctness of the protocol as well as the results of formal verification efforts are reported.
Introduction
Synchronization and coordination algorithms are part of distributed computer systems. Clock synchronization algorithms are essential for managing the use of resources and controlling communication in a distributed system. Also, a fundamental criterion in the design of a robust distributed system is to provide the capability of tolerating and potentially recovering from failures that are not predictable in advance. Overcoming such failures is most suitably addressed by tolerating Byzantine faults [1] . A Byzantine-fault model encompasses all unexpected failures, including transient ones, within the limitations of the maximum number of faults at a given time. Driscoll et al. [2] addressed the frequency of occurrences of Byzantine faults in practice and the necessity to tolerate Byzantine faults in ultra-reliable distributed systems. A distributed system tolerating as many as F Byzantine faults requires a network size of more than 3F nodes. Lamport et al. [1, 3] were the first to present the problem and show that Byzantine agreement cannot be achieved for fewer than 3F +1 nodes. Dolev et al. [4] proved that at least 3F + 1 nodes are necessary for clock synchronization in the presence of F Byzantine faults.
A distributed system is defined to be self-stabilizing if, from an arbitrary state and in the presence of bounded number of Byzantine faults, it is guaranteed to reach a legitimate state in a finite amount of time and remain in a legitimate state as long as the number of Byzantine faults are within a specific bound. A legitimate state is a state where all good clocks in the system are synchronized within a given precision bound. Therefore, a selfstabilizing system is able to start in a random state and recover from transient failures after the faults dissipate. The concept of self-stabilizing distributed computation was first presented in a classic paper by Dijkstra [5] . In that paper, he speculated whether it would be possible for a set of machines to stabilize their collective behavior in spite of unknown initial conditions and distributed control. The idea was that the system should be able to converge to a legitimate state within a bounded amount of time, by itself, and without external intervention.
This paper addresses the problem of synchronizing clocks in a distributed system in the presence of Byzantine faults. There are many algorithms that address permanent faults [6] , where the issue of transient failures is either ignored or inadequately addressed. There are many efficient Byzantine clock synchronization algorithms that are based on assumptions on initial synchrony of the nodes [6, 7] or existence of a common pulse at the nodes, e.g. the first protocol in [8] . There are many clock synchronization algorithms that are based on randomization and, therefore, are non-deterministic, e.g. the second protocol in [8] . Some clock synchronization algorithms have provisions for initialization and/or reintegration [7, 9] . However, solving these special cases is insufficient to make the algorithm self-stabilizing. A self-stabilizing algorithm encompasses these special scenarios without having to address them separately. The main challenges associated with self-stabilization are the complexity of the design and the proof of correctness of the protocol. Another difficulty is achieving efficient convergence time for the proposed selfstabilizing protocol.
Other recent developments in this area are the algorithms developed by Daliot et al [10, 11] . The algorithm in [11] is called the Byzantine self-stabilization pulse synchronization (BSS-Pulse-Synch) protocol. A flaw in BSS-Pulse-Synch protocol was found and documented in [12] . The biologically inspired Pulse Synchronization protocol in [10] has claims of self-stabilization, but no mechanized 1 proofs are provided.
In this paper a rapid Byzantine self-stabilizing clock synchronization protocol is presented that self-stabilizes from any state, tolerates bursts of transient failures, and deterministically converges within a linear convergence time with respect to the selfstabilization period. Upon self-stabilization, all good clocks proceed synchronously. This protocol has been the subject of rigorous verification efforts that support the claim of correctness.
Topology
The underlying topology considered here is a network of K nodes that communicate by exchanging messages through a set of communication channels. The communication channels are assumed to connect a set of source nodes to a set of destination nodes such that the source of a given message is distinctly identifiable from other sources of messages. This system of K nodes can tolerate a maximum of F Byzantine faulty nodes, where K ≥ 3F +1. Therefore, the minimum number of good nodes in the system, G, is given by G = K-F and thus G ≥ (2F + 1) nodes. Let K G represent the set of good nodes. The nodes communicate with each other by exchanging broadcast messages. Broadcast of a message to all other nodes is realized by transmitting the message to all other nodes at the same time. The source of a message is assumed to be uniquely identifiable. The communication network does not guarantee any order of arrival of a transmitted message at the receiving nodes. To paraphrase Kopetz [13] , a consistent delivery order of a set of messages does not necessarily reflect the temporal or causal order of the events. Each node is driven by an independent local physical oscillator. The oscillators of good nodes have a known bounded drift rate, 1 >>ρ ≥ 0, with respect to real time. Each node has two logical time clocks, Local_Timer and State_Timer, which locally keep track of the passage of time as indicated by the physical oscillator. In the context of this report, all references to clock synchronization and self-stabilization of the system are with respect to the State_Timer and the Local_Timer of the nodes. There is neither a central clock nor an externally generated global pulse. The communication channels and the nodes can behave arbitrarily, provided that eventually the system adheres to the system assumptions (see Section 3.5).
The latency of interdependent communications between the nodes is expressed in terms of the minimum event-response delay, D, and network imprecision, d. These parameters are described with the help of Figure 1 . In Figure 1 , a message transmitted by node N i at real time t 0 is expected to arrive at all destination nodes N j , be processed, and subsequent messages generated by N j within the time interval of
Communication between independently clocked nodes is inherently imprecise. The network imprecision, d, is the maximum time difference between all good receivers, N j , of a message from N i with respect to real time. The imprecision is due to the drift of the clocks with respect to real time, jitter, discretization error, and slight variations in the communication delay due to various causes such as temperature effects and differences in the lengths of the physical communication medium. These two parameters are assumed to be bounded such that D ≥ 1 and d ≥ 0 and both have values with units of real time nominal tick. For the remainder of this report, all references to time are with respect to the nominal tick and are simply referred to as clock ticks. 
Protocol Description
The self-stabilization problem has two facets. First, it is inherently event-driven and, second, it is time-driven. Most attempts at solving the self-stabilization problem have focused only on the event-driven aspect of this problem. Additionally, all efforts toward solving this problem must recognize that the system undergoes two distinct phases, unstabilized and stabilized, and that once stabilized, the system state needs to be preserved. The protocol presented here properly merges the time and event driven aspects of this problem in order to self-stabilize the system in a gradual and yet timely manner. Furthermore, this protocol is based on the concept of a continual vigilance of state of the system in order to maintain and guarantee its stabilized status, and a continual reaffirmation of nodes by declaring their internal status. Finally, initialization and/or reintegration are not treated as special cases. These scenarios are regarded as inherent part of this self-stabilizing protocol.
The self-stabilization events are captured at a node via a selection function that is based on received valid messages from other nodes. When such an event occurs, it is said that a node has accepted or an accept event has occurred. When the system is stabilized, it is said to be in the steady state.
In order to achieve self-stabilization, the nodes communicate by exchanging two selfstabilization messages labeled Resync and Affirm. The Resync message reflects the time-driven aspect of this self-stabilization protocol, while the Affirm message reflects the event-driven aspect of it. The Resync message is transmitted when a node realizes that the system is no longer stabilized or as a result of a resynchronization timeout. The Affirm message is transmitted periodically and at specific intervals primarily in response to a legitimate self-stabilization accept event at the node. The Affirm message either indicates that the node is in the transition process to another state in its attempt toward synchronization, or reaffirms that the node will remain synchronized. The timing diagram of transmissions of a good node during the steady state is depicted in Figure 2 , where Resync messages are represented as R and Affirm messages are represented as A. As depicted, the expected sequence of messages transmitted by a good node is a Resync message followed by a number of Affirm messages, i.e. RAAA … AAARAA. Three fundamental parameters characterize the self-stabilization protocol presented here, namely K, D, and d. The bound on the number of faulty nodes, F, the number of good nodes, G, and the remaining parameters that are subsequently enumerated are derived parameters and are based on these three fundamental parameters. Furthermore, except for K, F, and G which are integer numbers, all other parameters are real numbers.
In particular, ∆ AA is used as a threshold value for monitoring of proper timing of incoming and outgoing Affirm messages. The derived parameters T A = G -1 and T R = F + 1 are used as thresholds in conjunction with the Affirm and Resync messages, respectively.
The Monitor
The transmitted messages to be delivered to the destination nodes are deposited on communication channels. To closely observe the behavior of other nodes, a node employs (K-1) monitors, one monitor for each source of incoming messages as shown in Figure 3 .
A node neither uses nor monitors its own messages. The distributed observation of other nodes localizes error detection of incoming messages to their corresponding monitors, and allows for modularization and distribution of the self-stabilization protocol process within a node. A monitor keeps track of the activities of its corresponding source node. A monitor detects proper sequence and timeliness of the received messages from its corresponding source node. A monitor reads, evaluates, time stamps, validates, and stores only the last message it receives from that node. Additionally, a monitor ascertains the health condition of its corresponding source node by keeping track of the current state of that node. As K increases so does the number of monitors instantiated in each node. Although similar modules have been used in engineering practice and, conceptually, by others in theoretical work, as far as the author is aware this is the first use of the monitors as an integral part of a self-stabilization protocol. 
The State Machine
The assessment results of the monitored nodes are utilized by the node in the selfstabilization process. The node consists of a state machine and a set of (K-1) monitors.
The state machine has two states, Restore state (T) and Maintain state (M), that reflect the current state of the node in the system as shown in Figure 4 . The state machine describes the behavior of the node, N i , utilizing assessment results from its monitors, M 1 .. Figure 3 , where M j is the monitor for the corresponding node N j . In addition to the behavior of its corresponding source node, a monitor's internal status is influenced by the current state of the node's state machine. In a master-slave fashion, when the state machine transitions to another state it directs the monitors to update their internal status. The self-stabilization period is defined as the maximum time interval (during the steady state) that a good node engages in the self-stabilization process. In this protocol the selfstabilization period depends on the current state of the node. Specifically, the selfstabilization period for the Restore state is represented by P T and the self-stabilization period for the Maintain state is represented by P M . P T and P M are expressed in terms of ∆ AA . Although a Resync message is transmitted immediately after the node realizes that it is no longer stabilized, an Affirm message is transmitted once every ∆ AA .
A node keeps track of time by incrementing a logical time clock, State_Timer, once every ∆ AA . After the State_Timer reaches P T or P M , depending on the current state of the node, the node experiences a timeout, transmits a new Resync message, resets the State_Timer, transitions to the Restore state, and attempts to resynchronize with other nodes. If the node was in the Restore state it remains in that state after the timeout. The current value of this timer reflects the duration of the current state of the node. It also provides insight in assessing the state of the system in the self-stabilization process. In addition to the State_Timer, the node maintains the logical time clock Local_Timer. The Local_Timer is incremented once every ∆ AA and is reset only when the node has transitioned to the Maintain state and remained in that state for at least ∆ Precision , where ∆ Precision is the maximum guaranteed self-stabilization precision. The Local_Timer is intended to be used by higher level protocols and is used in assessing the state of the system in the self-stabilization process.
The monitor's status reflects its perception of its corresponding source node. In particular, a monitor keeps track of the incoming messages from its corresponding source and ensures that only valid messages are stored. This protocol is expected to be used as the fundamental mechanism in bringing and maintaining a system within a known synchronization bound. This protocol neither maintains a history of past behavior of the nodes nor does it attempt to classify the nodes into good and faulty ones. All such determination about the health status of the nodes in the system is assumed to be done by higher level mechanisms.
Message Sequence
An expected sequence is defined as a stream of Affirm messages enclosed by two Resync messages where all received messages arrive within their expected arrival times. The time interval between the last two Resync messages is represented by ∆ RR . As described earlier, starting from the last transmission of the Resync message consecutive Affirm messages are transmitted at ∆ AA intervals. At the receiving nodes, the following definitions hold:
-A message (Resync or Affirm) from a given source is valid if it is the first message from that source. -An Affirm message from a given source is early if it arrives earlier than (∆ AA -d) of its previous valid message (Resync or Affirm).
-A Resync message from a given source is early if it arrives earlier than ∆ RR,min of its previous valid Resync message. -An Affirm message from a given source is valid if it is not early. -A Resync message from a given source is valid if it is not early.
The protocol works when the received messages do not violate their timing requirements. However, in addition to inspecting the timing requirements, examining the expected sequence of the received messages provides stronger error detection at the nodes.
Protocol Functions
Two functions, InvalidAffirm() and InvalidResync(), are used by the monitors. The InvalidAffirm() function determines whether or not a received Affirm message is valid. The InvalidResync() function determines if a received Resync message is valid. When either of these functions returns a true value, it is indicative of an unexpected behavior by the corresponding source node.
The Accept() function is used by the state machine of the node in conjunction with the threshold value T A = G -1. When at least T A valid messages (Resync or Affirm) have been received, this function returns a true value indicating that an accept event has occurred and such event has also taken place in at least F other good nodes. When a node accepts, it consumes all valid messages used in the accept process by the corresponding function. Consumption of a message is the process by which a monitor is informed that its stored message, if it existed and was valid, has been utilized by the state machine.
The Retry() function is used by the state machine of the node with the threshold value T R = F +1. This function determines if at least T R other nodes have transitioned out of the Maintain state. A node, via its monitors, keeps track of the current state of other nodes. When at least T R valid Resync messages from as many nodes have been received, this function returns a true value indicating that at least one good node has transitioned to the Restore state. This function is used to transition from the Maintain state to the Restore state.
The TransitoryConditionsMet() function is used by the state machine of the node to determine proper timing of the transition from the Restore state to the Maintain state. This function keeps track of the accept events, by incrementing the Accept_Event_Counter, to determine if at least 2F accept events in as many ∆ AA intervals have occurred. It returns a true value when the transitory conditions (Section 3.2) are met.
The TimeOutRestore() function uses P T as a boundary value and asserts a timeout condition when the value of the State_Timer has reached P T . Such timeout triggers the node to reengage in another round of self-stabilization process. This function is used when the node is in the Restore state.
The TimeOutMaintain() function uses P M as a boundary value and asserts a timeout condition when the value of the State_Timer has reached P M . Such timeout triggers the node to reengage in another round of synchronization. This function is used when the node is in the Maintain state.
In addition to the above functions, the state machine utilizes the TimeOutAcceptEvent() function. This function is used to regulate the transmission time of the next Affirm message. This function maintains a DeltaAA_Timer by incrementing it once per local clock tick and once it reaches the transmission time of the next Affirm message, ∆ AA , it returns a true value. In the advent of such timeout, the node transmits an Affirm message. 6. The initial values of the state and all variables of a node can be set to any arbitrary value within their corresponding range. In an implementation, it is expected that some local capabilities exist to enforce type consistency of all variables.
The Self-Stabilizing Clock Synchronization Problem
To simplify the presentation of this protocol, it is assumed that all time references are with respect to a real time t 0 when the system assumptions are satisfied and the system operates within the system assumptions. Let • C be the maximum convergence time,
• ∆ Local_Timer (t), for real time t, the maximum time difference of the Local_Timers of any two good nodes N i and N j , and
• ∆ Precision the maximum guaranteed self-stabilization precision between the Local_Timer's of any two good nodes N i and N j in the presence of a maximum of F faulty nodes,
Convergence: From any state, the system converges to a self-stabilized state after a finite amount of time.
Closure: When all good nodes have converged to a given self-stabilization precision,
∆ Precision , at time C, the system shall remain within the self-stabilization precision ∆ Precision for t ≥ C, for real time t.
where, 
and the amount of drift from the initial precision is given by
The Byzantine-Fault Tolerant Self-Stabilizing Protocol for Distributed Clock Synchronization Systems
The presented protocol is described in Figure 5 and consists of a state machine and a set of monitors which execute once every local oscillator tick. • Indentation is used to show a block of sequential statements.
• ',' is used to separate sequential statements.
• '.' is used to end a statement.
• '.,' is used to mark the end of a statement and at the same time to separate it from other sequential statements.
Proof of the Protocol
The approach for the proof is to show that a system of K ≥ 3F + 1 nodes converges from any condition to a state where all good nodes are in the Maintain state. This system is then shown to remain within the timing bounds of the self-stabilization precision of ∆ Precision . A sketch of the proof of the protocol is presented here. Details of the proof are documented in [14] .
Assumptions: All good nodes are active and the system operates within the system assumptions. In this proof, unless otherwise stated in the Lemmas and Theorems, no other assumptions are made about the system.
A node behaves properly if it executes the protocol. From Theorem RestoreToMaintain, the maximum possible transitory delay for a node in the Restore state is 8F∆ AA . However, in order to allow the node to transition to the Maintain state at the next ∆ AA , it has to be prevented from timing out. Therefore, the required minimum period, P T,min is constrained to be P T,min = (8F+2) ∆ AA . Although P T can be any value larger than P T,min , it follows from Theorem RestoreToMaintain that it cannot exceed that minimum value. Also, in order to expedite the self-stabilization process, the convergence time has to be minimized. Thus, P T is constrained to P T,min . The selfstabilization period for the Maintain state, P M , is typically much larger than P T . Thus, P M is constrained to be P M ≥ P T .
Corollary RestoreToMaintainWithin2P T -A good node in the Restore state will always transition to the Maintain state within 2P T .
All good nodes validate an Affirm message from a good node if the minimum arrival time requirement for that message is not violated. By Lemma DeltaRRmin, consecutive
Resync messages from a good node are always more than ∆ RR,min apart. Therefore, after a random start-up, it takes more than ∆ RR,min clock ticks for Resync messages from a good node to be accepted by all other good nodes. If a node is in the Restore state, from Theorem ResyncWithinP T , it will either time out and transmit a Resync message within P T or from Theorem RestoreToMaintain and Corollary RestoreToMaintainWithin2P T , it will transition to the Maintain state within 2P T . Therefore, for the proof of this protocol, and for the following lemmas and theorems, the state of the system is considered after 2P T ∆ AA clock ticks from a random start. At this point, the system is in one of the following three states and all messages from the good nodes meet their timing requirements at the receiving good nodes. ProofThe proof of this theorem consists of proving the convergence and closure properties as defined in the Self-Stabilizing Clock Synchronization Problem section.
Convergence -From any state, the system converges to a self-stabilized state after a finite amount of time. 
Proof -It follows from Theorems ClosureAllMaintain and LocalTimerWithinPrecision that such system always remains stabilized and ∆ Local_Timer (t) ≤ ∆ Precision for t ≥ C.
♦
This protocol neither maintains a history of past behavior of the nodes nor does it attempt to classify the nodes into good and faulty ones. Since this protocol self-stabilizes from any state, initialization and/or reintegration are not treated as special cases. Therefore, a reintegrating node will always be admitted to participate in the selfstabilization process as soon as it becomes active. Continual transmission of the Affirm messages by the good nodes expedites the reintegration process.
Theorem ConvergeTime -A system of K ≥ 3F + 1 nodes converges from any random state to a self-stabilized state within C = (2P T + P M ) ∆ AA clock ticks.
If P M = P T , then C = 3P M , but since typically P M >> P T , therefore, C can be approximated to C ≅ P M . Therefore, the convergence time of this protocol is a linear function of the P M .
Achieving Tighter Precision
Since the self-stabilization messages are communicated at ∆ AA intervals, if ∆ AA , and hence ∆ Precision , are larger than the desired precision, the system is said to be Coarsely Synchronized. Otherwise, the system is said to be Finely Synchronized. If the granularity provided by the self-stabilization precision is coarser than desired, a higher synchronization precision can be achieved in a two step process. First, a system from any initial state has to be Coarsely Synchronized and guaranteed that the system remains Coarsely Synchronized and operates within a known precision, ∆ Precision . The second step, in conjunction with the Coarse Synchronization protocol, is to utilize a proven protocol that is based on the initial synchrony assumptions to achieve optimum precision of the synchronized system. The Coarse Synchronization protocol initiates the start of the Fine Synchronization protocol if a tighter precision of the system is desired. The Coarse protocol maintains self-stabilization of the system while the Fine Synchronization protocol increases the precision of the system.
Conclusions
In this paper, a rapid Byzantine self-stabilizing clock synchronization protocol is presented that self-stabilizes from any state. It tolerates bursts of transient failures, and deterministically converges with a linear convergence time with respect to the selfstabilization period. Upon self-stabilization, all good clocks proceed synchronously. This protocol has been the subject of a rigorous verification effort. A 4-node system consisting of 3 good nodes and one Byzantine faulty node has been proven correct using model checking. The proposed protocol explores the timing and event driven facets of the selfstabilization problem. The protocol employs monitors to closely observe the activities of the nodes in the system. All timing measures of variables are based on the node's local clock and thus no central clock or externally generated pulse is used. The proposed protocol is scalable with respect to the fundamental parameters, K, D, and d. The selfstabilization precision ∆ Precision , ∆ Local_Timer (t), and self-stabilization periods P T and P M are functions of K, D and d. The convergence time is a linear function of P T and P M and deterministic. Therefore, although there is no theoretical upper bound on the maximum values for the fundamental parameters, implementation of this protocol may introduce some practical limitations on the maximum value of these parameters and the choice of topology. Since only two self-stabilization messages, namely Resync and Affirm messages, are required for the proper operation of this protocol, a single bit suffices to represent both messages. Therefore, for a data message w bits wide, the self-stabilization overhead will be 1/w per transmission.
A sketch of proof of this protocol has been presented in this paper. This protocol is expected to be used as the fundamental mechanism in bringing and maintaining a system within bounded synchrony. Integration of a higher level mechanism with this protocol needs to be further studied. Furthermore, if a higher level secondary protocol is non-selfstabilizing, it is conjectured that it can be made self-stabilizing when used in conjunction with the protocol presented here. We have started formalizing the integration process of other protocols with this protocol in order to achieve tighter synchronization. We are also planning to implement this protocol in hardware and characterize it in a representative adverse environment.
